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LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960. By Laura Kalman. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 314. $35. 
Legal realism developed as a challenge to the Langdellian case 
method of legal education, which originated at Harvard and spread to 
law schools throughout the country.1 Realists criticized the case 
method's emphasis on studying appellate opinions as the sole method 
for teaching law students to identify general legal principles. The case 
method strove to isolate from their context in society the rules and 
principles of law that influenced judges. The American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement of the. Law project is a good example of this con-
ceptualist approach. The Harvard professors serving as ALI reporters 
were told to "simplify unnecessary complexities," and the rules they 
identified were printed in "especially bold black letters" (p. 14). In the 
extreme, the realists felt, this passion for legal rules and principles re-
sulted in scholarly efforts of dubious value, such as Harvard law pro-
fessor Joseph Beale's attempt to reduce the entire field of Conflict of 
Laws to two principles.2 
Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960, by Laura Kalman,3 is another 
in the Studies in Legal History series published by the University of 
North Carolina Press in association with the American Society for 
Legal History.4 The author's intent in writing the book, she declares 
in her prologue, was to provide a "case study of the interrelationship 
between intellectual theory and institutional factors within the specific 
context of legal education" (p. xi). To this end, she examines both 
jurisprudential and institutional aspects of legal realism.5 Kalman first 
1. Christopher Columbus Langdell, dean of Harvard Law School between 1870 and 1895, 
thought of law as a science, best taught as a system of rules and principles. Langdell looked for 
these rules in appellate cases, which he collected and organized in casebooks. His "case method" 
helped to make the university the center of legal education. P. xii. 
2. P. 25. These principles were territoriality and vested rights. Beale came under heavy 
attack from realists who thought his restatement of Conflict of Laws, J. BEALE, TREATISE ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), sacrificed inevitable complexity to his desire for one logical set 
of rules. 
3. Laura Kalman (B.A., Pomona; J.D., UCLA; M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Yale) is associate pro-
fessor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
4. There are to date seventeen titles in the Studies in Legal History series. See, e.g., R. 
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY (1985); M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986) (reviewed in 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1109). 
5. Realism was a phase of American intellectual history as well as a new method of legal 
education. See, e.g., W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); W. TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVE-
MENT (1973); Dawson, Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406 (1983); 
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Purcell, American 
Jurisprudence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. 
H1sr. REV. 424 (1969); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From 
the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979). 
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provides a competent discussion of the context and characteristics of 
legal realism, comparing it to the dominant conceptualist approach. 
She explains and evaluates the contributions of many of the more im-
portant realists, including Jerome Frank, William Douglas, Arthur 
Corbin, and Karl Llewellyn. She then considers realism in its peda-
gogical aspect, tracing the effect of the realists' ideas on scholarship, 
curricula, casebooks, examinations, and faculty selection in the law 
schools. 
In Legal Realism at Yale, Kalman finds the origins of realism in 
the skepticism that led Oliver Wendell Holmes to suggest that judges 
made law in response to "the felt necessities of the time" (p. 17). Kal-
man describes the contrast between the conceptualists who maintained 
that judges simply found and applied existing legal rules to the facts 
before them, and realists who pointed out the role of human idiosyn-
cracy in decision making. Realists stressed facts over concepts, and 
contended that law must be studied in social context. They eagerly 
sought contributions to legal theory from other disciplines, attempting 
to integrate law with psychology, sociology, economics, history, and 
other social sciences. 
Yale proved to be the law school most receptive to realism. 
Although Kalman provides some mention of legal realists who were 
doing "colonial service"6 at lesser law schools, she focuses her inquiry 
on the realists' progress in New Haven. To a somewhat lesser extent 
she examines legal realism at the Harvard Law School, both because 
of Harvard's preeminence in legal education and because "so much of 
legal education at Yale has represented a rebellion against the Harvard 
approach that it would be impossible to understand Yale without stud-
ying Harvard" (p. xi). 
Kalman argues that the legal scholars of the 1920s and 1930s who 
called themselves realists and who quite consciously reacted against 
the type of legal education provided at Harvard nonetheless failed to 
carry out the reforms they advocated. Their casebooks and examina-
tions used the traditional conceptualist approach, and the faculty did 
little to integrate the social sciences with law.7 It was the Yale law 
professors of the 1940s and 1950s who, though not calling themselves 
realists, produced books and taught in conformity with realist theory.8 
6. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of 
Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1980). 
7. P. 229. Kalman does note the exceptions to this frequent failure of realist professors to 
make their casebooks reflect their stated interest in the social sciences. For example, in 1930 
Karl Llewellyn's textbook was titled Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, rather than Cases 
on the Law of Sales, with the "Materials" including annotations about business organization, 
marketing practices, bills of lading, etc. Cases were only 33% of the book's pages. P. 79. But 
for the most part, Kalman argues, the realists neglected social sciences and social policy, and 
their casebooks "never realized the vision that had started the revolution." P. 95. 
8. Kalman mentions in particular Yale law professors Harry Shulman, George Dession, and 
Myres McDougal. Pp. 150-52. 
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The impact of realism on American legal education owes much to 
these "second-generation" realists, whose casebooks for the first time 
successfully integrated legal materials with learning from the social 
sciences. Harry Shulman's 1949 Cases on Labor Relations, for exam-
ple, was written in collaboration with an economist. The book, a col-
lection of arbitration decisions, cited all the relevant economic 
literature and was designed for use not only in law schools, but also in 
business schools and departments of economics, political science, and 
sociology (p. 151). By 1960, Kalman concludes, the contribution of 
the realists to legal education was substantial, and students were leav-
ing law school with a better understanding of the social context of law 
(p. 229). 
Kalman's examination of the institutional factors that checked the 
growth of legal realism at Yale yields her most detailed and convinc-
ing argument. She warns that "[h]istorians of intellectual movements 
tend to forget the institutional constraints within which such move-
ments operated" (p. xi) and she is careful not to make that mistake 
herself. Her research convinced her that institutional factors might be 
almost as important as intellectual theory in explaining the differences 
in approach between Harvard and Yale. 9 
Among the institutional factors receiving Kalman's attention is 
Yale Law School's relatively poor endowment during many of the 
years the realists were attempting to introduce changes (p. 121). The 
school lacked sufficient funds to attract new professors, build class-
rooms, and improve its library. Many of the better students in the 
applicant pool preferred to attend Harvard, and Yale also lost promis-
ing professors to better-paying schools. 
Low salaries weren't the only cause of the faculty defections that 
hampered realism's advance, however. Kalman is particularly percep-
tive in examining the conflicts, both personal and intellectual, among 
faculty members and between the faculty and the Law School's dean. 
She also demonstrates how the tensions inevitable between a profes-
sional school, jealous of its autonomy and reputation, and the univer-
sity of which it is an often troublesome part, hindered the success of 
the realists at Yale. Because of an unsympathetic or uncomprehend-
ing university administration, Yale's realists were repeatedly denied 
funds or faculty appointments they thought crucial.10 
9. Kalman does not suggest that institutional factors were ever more important than intellec-
tual theory in accounting for the differences in legal education at Harvard and Yale. Rather, she 
maintains that such factors are often overlooked although they are deserving of study. In her 
view, institutional factors interacted with flaws in realism as a legal theory and as a method of 
legal education, causing the realist approach to "break down." P. 121. 
10. Pp. 127-28. Charles Clark, on his last day as dean of Yale Law School, recorded his view 
of what had been his duty to the law school: "My theory of administrative responsibility ... was 
that I must represent my department against the needs and demands of other parts of even the 
same University." P. 122. 
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Kalman also suggests that a dismaying degree of anti-semitism 
among Yale's administrators and faculty prevented the appointment 
of some of the more talented and committed realists available for 
professorships (p. 143). Aware of the reluctance of some of his col-
leagues to select Jews for the faculty, Thurman Arnold wryly reported 
to William Douglas the difficulty the Yale governing board was having 
in finding suitable candidates for law professorships: "What we want 
is somebody like Jesus Christ would have been had he had conserva-
tive ideas and not been a Jew" (p. 139). 
Finally, the conservatism of much of the student body also slowed 
realism's development at Yale during the 1930s and 1940s. Students 
avoided many of the more innovative classes and instead clustered 
overwhelmingly in the "practical" courses thought to be the best prep-
aration for a Wall Street career (p. 136). Students were reluctant to 
abandon the legal certainty the conceptualist approach offered, and it 
proved difficult to convince them that the study of law should be more 
than just memorizing rules. An exasperated Charles Alan Wright, 
teaching at the University of Minnesota Law School, recorded his 
frustration in a letter to his former teacher at Yale, Fred Rodell: 
I was spoiled at Yale; since everyone I knew there conceded the ridicu-
lousness of conceptualism, I supposed that that devil had been exorcised, 
and that legal realism, in greater or less degree, was everywhere trium-
phant. I couldn't have been more wrong. From morning to night, I 
fight with my classes, with students in to see me, and with some mem-
bers of the faculty, and all I get from them is: "What was good enough 
for Langdell is good enough for me." Or "It's easy to decide cases. You 
just take the facts and look in the law books and get your answer auto-
matically." (Honest to goodness- I asked the student ifhe thought the 
law worked like a slot machine and he said "Yes.") Or I will waste a 
whole class hour going over all the possible policy ramifications of a 
case, and problems of that sort in it, and someone is sure to come up 
after the hour: "Mr. Wright, what is the rule of the case?" I find myself 
alternating between an eager determination to stand this conceptualism 
on its ear, and a feeling of why the hell am I wasting my time here. [p. 
95] 
Legal Realism at Yale is meticulously and imaginatively 
researched. The book draws on the established scholarship on legal 
realism, but supplements it with Kalman's original research into the 
primary sources. Kalman interviewed many of the participants in the 
Yale movement. She analyzed their casebooks and the examinations 
they gave. She consulted the Deans' files at Harvard and Yale, as well 
as the correspondence and reports of faculty members. She examined 
the minutes of the governing bodies of Harvard and Yale and read 
contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts of legal realism. 
Kalman's writing style is clear, and formal without being pedantic. 
She has a talent for finding descriptive and amusing anecdotes to illus-
trate her points. However, the book suffers somewhat from a rather 
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plodding organization. And while the mass of detail offered testifies to 
Kalman's meticulous research, it tends to obscure the broad outlines 
of the topic, forcing the reader to struggle for synthesis. 
Although Kalman concludes that "pedagogically, the realist move-
ment had not fulfilled its promise" (p. 230), it did have a profound 
effect on American legal education. The curricula of law schools to-
day reflect the methods of the realists. And the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, which in recent years has caused a furor among law facul-
ties, is an heir to realism in questioning traditional jurisprudence. The 
CLS movement, far from repudiating realism, carries on its legacy of 
questioning the importance of legal rules and principles. It goes be-
yond realism in its emphasis on the contradictory norms of law and its 
willingness to question the value of much that the realists accepted, 
such as the importance of lawyers and dispute resolution. Much of 
what Kalman reports of the suspicion and controversy the realists en-
gendered among colleagues and law school alumni will be familiar to 
present-day readers of law reviews and journals of legal education. 
The value of Kalman's book lies not only in its careful scholarship, 
but also in its perspective on contemporary legal education and its fas-
cinating account of institutional politics. Kalman's analysis of institu-
tional constraints on intellectual theory should be useful to those 
considering intellectual movements in law schools today, such as Criti-
cal Legal Studies and the "Chicago School" of economic analysis. 
Kalman reminds us that what Lenin said of law is true of legal educa-
tion as well: it is a political instrument; it is politics.11 
- Karin M Wentz 
11. Kalman declares that realism's "most important message" is that "all law is politics." P. 
231. 
